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IREA focuses on four priority lines of investigation: (i) the quantitative study of regional and 
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evaluation of public policies. 
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Abstract 
 
Informality has been given adverse associations as a result of its economic and social 
consequences in developed and developing countries. The latter group of countries has been 
the most affected in terms of low productivity, unprotected workers and the erosion of 
institutional credibility. Although the determinants of informality have been studied before, the 
research conducted on micro firms in a developing country has been less notable. In this 
paper, Mexico is taken as case study due to its high level of micro firm informality and the 
heterogeneity among Mexican states.  The aim of this paper is to analyse the determinants of 
micro firm informality by state, using different public sources, such as the Encuesta Nacional de 
Micronegocios (ENAMIN, or the National Micro Firm Survey), the Instituto Nacional de Estadisica 
(INEGI, or the National Institute for Statistics) and the Secretaría de Economía (SE, or the 
Secretariat for Economics). Econometric panel data models were estimated for a sample of 32 
states over the 2008-2012 period. Furthermore, this paper uses different definitions of 
informality to check the robustness of the results. The empirical evidence obtained allows us to 
conclude that, although economic factors are the main causes of informality, variables such as 
corruption and education have an important role to play. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been an increasing interest in informality in recent years, taking a more 
significant position in economic analysis with the growth of this sector in most developing 
countries. According to the International Labour Organization1 (ILO), the informal 
economy can account for half to three-quarters of all non-agricultural employment in 
developing countries. The growth has been attributed largely to the fact that the formal 
economy cannot absorb all workforces and the inability of firms to adapt to new market 
conditions. Even so, this sector has been considered as an alternative to reduce pressure on 
economies, although informal sector conditions are usually precarious in both labour and 
economic terms (Perry and William, 2007). 
Although there have been many studies conducted on informality, most of them have been 
centred on labour issues, focussing on the worker’s point of view. However, economic units 
have been largely ignored, with researchers choosing not to target firms or productive units. 
Furthermore, defining the informality of a firm has been always a problem for every study, 
with this being a crucial step through which can be found all the differences among studies 
on this subject. However, there is an agreement on general definitions, such as the 
definition of when a worker or firm falls outside the legal framework of government. In the 
case of firms, most of studies have opted for a definition in terms of registration due to data 
limitations. However, measuring informality is not the only problem, for instance, when it 
is analysed under different definitions, it can be seen that it varies depending on informality 
concept. 
There are different theoretical arguments to explain why a firm can be found in the 
informal sector. La Porta and Schleifer (2014) summarise the predominant reasons, such as 
the firm being representative of an untapped reservoir of entrepreneurial energy, or that the 
informal entrepreneur enjoys the advantages of avoiding taxation and regulation. More 
                                                            
1 According to the report, 48 per cent of non-agricultural employment in North Africa; 51 per cent in Latin 
America; 65 per cent in Asia; and 72 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa (ILO, 2002). 
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radical still, they cite these firms as parasites competing unfairly or that they are the product 
of poverty, with the only way to reduce their number is by means of development and the 
expansion of economy. 
Informality has been increasingly recognised as a significant factor in every country 
because it has economic and social consequences, with, for example, informality being 
linked to low productivity. Furthermore, most informal firms are small, inefficient and run 
by poorly educated people. If their number is not reduced, informality can clearly affect the 
future growth of developing countries (Perry et al.2007; Loayza 2009). With too many 
informal firms, governments cannot collect enough taxes, which can lead to the reduction 
in investment in public infrastructure, public education or the health system. 
While informality has been studied by many researchers using national level data, the 
determinants on a regional level have not been studied enough. Moreover, to the knowledge 
of this author, there are no studies explaining the different extents of informality for micro 
firms among Mexican states, where the informal sector generated 25.0% of GDP2 in 2012. 
In other words, in the analysis of informality, the economic unit has been overlooked. 
This study aims to examine and analyse the factors which determine the informality of 
productive units, by state in Mexico. The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 
presents a review of the literature in order to explore the different definitions and to reach a 
consensus and then provides an explanation as to what kind of informality measures are 
used in this study; Section 3 presents the database used in this study and the manner in 
which the different variables were constructed: Section 4 describes the methodology 
employed; econometric analysis is carried out and results discussed in Section 5; and, 
conclusions are summarized in Section 6.   
 
                                                            
2 According to official figures of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) six out of ten 
employed workers are in the informal sector.  
 
4 
 
2. Literature overview 
What is informality? 
If there is one thing on which every study agrees about informality, it is that it is not an 
easy concept to define and measure. The term “informality” may mean different things, 
depending on the point of view of the person, piece of research or institution. On the one 
hand, it can be considered as a bad thing, often entailing unprotected workers, street-
selling, low productivity, and tax evasion, among others. On the other hand, it can often be 
related to entrepreneurship, which is linked to innovation. This section sees to explain what 
informality is and review the main definitions and concepts. 
Informality has different meanings according to each school of thought. The dualist school 
sees the informal sector as comprising marginal activities that provide income and safety to 
poor people, while the structuralist school understands the informal economy as a way to 
help reduce inputs and labour costs. The legalistic school views matters from a regulatory 
standpoint, in that micro-entrepreneurs choose this sector as a way to avoid costs, while the 
voluntarist school states that it is borne of attempts to avoid regulation (Alter 2012). While 
it is difficult to define informality, finding a simple method of doing so can help to create a 
proxy and thus measure it; for example, it has been proposed that formal activities are those 
which are recognized and regulated by states, and informal ones are those which are not 
(Weeks 1975). 
Two definitions of informality that can clearly be found in the literature come from a 
productivity and legalistic standpoint respectively. The former is identified using 
characteristics from the area of employment, such as non-professional workers, unskilled 
jobs, family workers, self-employment and workers in small firms. The latter is represented 
by the non-compliance with the laws of the state in question in terms of labor and social 
security legislation (Khamis 2012), where, for instance, self-employed workers or those 
without access to the social security system are included in this definition of informality. 
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International organizations, on the other hand, have also tried to conceptualize informality. 
In its 2003 Guidelines concerning a statistical definition of informal employment, the ILO 
recognizes the importance of consistency and coherence in the concepts used to define 
informal employment, such as the approach that focuses on the enterprise itself and the 
approach that is based on jobs. In this way, the informal economy includes the informal 
sector and informal employment, with the difference being that the enterprise approach is 
based on production units and the latter depends on the number of employees in this sector.  
Figure 1 
This paper focuses its analysis on economics units, placing the informality of firms at the 
centre of the study. This informality can include earning activities at the level of the firm 
that fall outside the purview and regulatory environment of the state (Portes and Schauffler 
1993; Pisani and Pagán 2004). However, it is difficult to define it as comprising “activities 
at the margin of government control and regulation” inasmuch as it would cover a broad 
range of activities, from illegal ones to others which are either legal or could depend on 
existing taxation and labour laws (Portes and Schauffler 1993). 
Most of the time, informality definitions refer to the market-based legal production of 
goods and services that is deliberately concealed from public authorities (Buehn and 
Schneider 2012). 
Whether or not the different definitions and concepts of informality are taken into account, 
it is possible to understand that there is no single kind of informality, and, therefore, it is 
plausible to say that there are different types and degrees of informality. 
Causes of informality 
There are many different points of view about the causes of informality, with Pisani and 
Pagán (2004) arguing, for instance, that we can distinguish four clear standpoints: the 
structuralist view that sees informality as an area of absorption for excess labour; the neo-
marxist view which focuses on production processes, employment relationships and the 
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link between national and global economies; the legalistic approach which argues that 
governmental institutions and regulation have forced entrepreneurs into the informal sector; 
and, the microenterprise approach which tries to encourage competitive ability as a means 
of escaping poverty. The structuralist view shares similarities with the dualist school, which 
says that informal actors are excluded from opportunities due to the disparity between 
population and employment growth (Alter 2012). 
Another explanation for informality comes from exit theory, which states that agents make 
an implicit cost-benefit analysis between the formal and informal sectors. For instance, 
micro firms can decide to avoid regulations and taxation because they have no intention to 
grow or no potential to do so. This theory is in line with the voluntarist school (Alter 2012). 
In contrast, the exclusion argument states that informality is a result of stringent and costly 
regulations as well as a lack of opportunities characterized by low productivity, an absence 
of labor benefits, irregular work conditions, high turnover, and lower rates of remuneration 
(Oviedo 2009). The exclusion argument is more in line with legalistic approach which 
states that institutions and regulation are the main factors that explain informality. 
In the case of the informal labor market, the discussion has focused on whether this market 
is segmented, integrated or a combination of both (Khamis 2012; Pages and Stampini 
2009). Workers decide to enter into informal sector for many reasons. Freije (2002) 
mentions some of them, such as informal mechanisms of social protection, credit 
restrictions, management risk. On the other hand, as labour protection laws can result in an 
implicit tax on workers or inflexible wages, informality can offer greater flexibility 
(Maloney 1999), for which reason, a cost-benefit analysis is carried out. On the other hand, 
there are some mid-term macroeconomic factors and other longer-term structural changes 
that can affect the formal sector, such as the reforms of the 1980s and 90s, including 
privatization, trade liberalization, and the modernization of the financial sector, that may 
have had an effect on labour markets by encouraging the substitutions of capital for labour 
(Freije 2002). Another example is the changes in Latin-American countries such as Brazil 
and Colombia which were driven by modifications in labour market regulation and social 
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security taxes in the early 1990s, when adjustments were carried out in macroeconomic 
politics such as the change from fixed to floating exchange rate (Perry et al. 2007). 
The empirical literature indicates that the excessive number of standards and regulations, as 
well as macroeconomic behavior, are one of the main factors behind informality (Freije 
2002). In other words, the excessively high barriers may cause micro firms to choose not to 
register. Even though it is seen as a backwards step, liquidity restrictions may lead poor 
people to consider investing in a microenterprise (Perry et al. 2007), although this would 
also indicate a lack of intent or potential for growth.  
The role of governments is another very important factor that has influenced the size of the 
informal sector, due to their capacity to change regulation through legislation. Studies have 
confirmed that informality is negatively associated with business regulation, law and order, 
and the capacity of government to enforce regulation (Loayza 2009; Masatlioglu and 
Rigolini 2008). Among the different regulations that are often mentioned in the literature is 
taxation because it is linked to higher informality inasmuch as it represents a barrier to 
formality, and the transaction costs are higher (Freije 2002). Additionally, the strength and 
efficiency of regulation are positively associated with the reduction of informality (Loayza 
2009). 
It is important to mention that the variable of corruption is often used as an indicator of the 
level of governmental weakness (Loayza 2009). Corruption can reduce the willingness of 
firms and workers to pay taxes because “everybody does it is involved in corrupt practice”; 
thus, the provision of public good is always sub-optimal (Oviedo 2009). The willingness to 
pay has been represented by means of the so-called “tax morale”, or the disposition of 
society toward tax compliance, with empirical studies finding a positive relationship with 
informality (Torgler 2005; Buehn and Schneider 2012). 
In the case of firm informality, its extent has been linked to size; the bigger the firm, in 
terms of production and employment, the lesser the informality. The reason behind this is 
that, as firms grow, they demand more formal services and institutions, so their exposure to 
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the authorities is greater (Perry et al. 2007). It should be mentioned that, according to the 
literature, most of firm informality is considered to occur in the smallest firms, such as 
family businesses or microenterprises, where labor is used intensively and there is no 
government regulation (Pisani and Pagán 2004). 
In summary, there is no unified explanation about the causes of informality, with its causes 
not sole economic in nature, with informality linked to an excessively regulated economy 
that restricts improved performance during economic shocks and that, thus, potentially 
damages growth3 (Loayza et al. 2009). Not only is it linked excessive regulation, but also to 
an insufficient enforcement of government regulation (Freije 2009). 
Consequences 
Informality is important not only because it represents a huge part of many economies in 
developing countries, but also because it has consequences from an economic and social 
viewpoint. It also entails undesirable effects such as; leaving families unprotected without 
formal mechanisms to mitigate economic shocks (Perry et al. 2007; Freije 2002); lags in 
growth and lower levels of growth productivity of an economy due to a greater 
concentration of workers in small firms (Perry et al. 2007, Freije 2002; Loayza 2009; La 
Porta and Schleifer 2014) which are typically small, inefficient, and run by poor 
entrepreneurs (La Porta and Shleifer 2014); lower fiscal capacities that may erode 
economic growth (Buehn and Schneider 2012); deterioration of the rule of law and the 
credibility of institutions (Perry et al. 2007). Informality can be an indicator of poor 
regulation and other governmental failures, and can also affect the ability of formal firms to 
innovate and to adopt other technologies (Perry et al. 2007).  
The proportion of micro firms in an economy, in terms of employees, has been considered 
to be a good proxy of informality. The workforce is concentrated in this kind of firm, which 
                                                            
3  Loayza  (2009)  explains  that  informality  is a distorted response because it entails the misallocation of 
resources and the loss, at least partially, of the advantages of legality, such as police and judicial protection, 
access to formal credit institutions, and participation in international markets. 
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can lead to efficiency losses because they cannot exploit the economies of scale that large 
firms can.  The presence of informal firms could slow down the process of creative 
destruction, or the replacement of inefficient firms (Pery et al. 2007). Not only are they less 
efficient and less productive, but also they are at a disadvantage due to a lack of access to 
the credit and legal protection infrastructure to which formal firms have access (De Paula 
and Scheinkman 2009). 
How to measure the informality? 
As mentioned above, there are different ways to approach and thus measure informality. As 
interest in this research is focused on the productive unit, this research explores different 
approaches to studying it. In the case of business, many studies have considered a firm as 
informal one that, for instance, does not report sales, or which exists on the margins of 
registered compliance with labour or tax laws (Maloney 1999). 
Another important aspect to identify is that there is not an only one but various degrees of 
informality. For example, a firm may not be registered at all and, thus, does not comply 
with any governmental legal requirements. On the other hand, a firm may be registered but, 
with respect to its employees, may not comply with labour laws, such as not registering its 
workers with the social security system or not paying all taxes due by underreporting sales. 
In other cases, some firms avoid paying their legally required contributions by hiring self-
employed workers instead of salaried workers (Brandt 2011, Perry et al. 2007) 
While the level of a firm’s informality can be measured based on its registration with the 
government, this implies a wider definition inasmuch as it would include all those firms 
that are not commercially registered, have formal accountancy processes, make social 
security or tax contributions, or make payments for licenses or mercantile registers. 
However, measuring informality without the use of mercantile registers is the most 
representative method (Cardenas and Rozo 2009). Cunningham and Maloney (2001) agree 
with this definition because participation in the formal market and legal institutions ranges 
from being unregistered with tax authorities, to being registered locally or being registered 
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with the federal tax authorities. Di Giannatale et al. (2013) consider a micro firm to be 
informal if it is not registered with the treasury ministry. Other studies have used other 
methods to proxy firm informality. One method is similar to those which use labor 
informality, with a focus in terms of protection, such as those owners or workers who are 
not protected by the social security system. While another measure used is the size of firms, 
this measure varies depending on the study, where informality is measured at, for example, 
fewer than 16 employees, or fewer than six workers (Maloney 1999), or, in other cases, at 
ten employees or fewer, or, even, at less than four workers (Mondragón-Vélez et al. 2010; 
La Porta and Shleifer 2014). Therefore, it can be seen that there is not a unified measure 
and that measuring informality in this way can vary according to data availability from one 
study to another. 
In the case the official institution of the country analyzed, the INEGI in Mexico identifies, 
based on the International Conference of Labor Statisticians (ICLS), some common 
characteristics of the informal sector from the perspective of the economic unit. These 
include not being registered with the government, being a small scale operation4, and the 
absence of formal accountancy processes5 (INEGI, 2014). 
Figure 2 
The point of analysis in this study, as mentioned above, is the economic unit. It tests the 
different levels of firm informality according to different informality measures such as self-
employment and owners of micro firms6.  
 
                                                            
4 Although small operation can be a characteristic of the informal sector, this is not a decisive element 
because, for instance, the simplification of bureaucracy in some countries can enable owners to do their own 
accounting. 
5 The informal sector is taken as when firms are not registered under any specific form of national legislation, 
such as tax or social security law. While it is important to be clear that the economic unit from the informal 
sector does not comply with the fundamental registration requirements, in the case of countries such as 
Mexico, there are simple accountancy measures that can be applied to imply a degree of formality. 
6 An independent worker does not have a boss or somebody who supervises or somebody who has not given 
operation reasons. 
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3. Data 
The database used in this research has been taken from different resources compiled by 
INEGI, the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE, or the National Survey of 
Occupations and Work), the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, Consejo Nacional de 
Población (CONAPO, or the National Council on Population), the SE, and the Encuesta 
Nacional de Micronegocios (ENAMIN, or the National Micro Firm Survey) 7, which forms 
much of the basis of this study inasmuch as it is focused on micro firms, thus making 
research at a deeper level into this sector in Mexico possible. The databases used for every 
variable are described in Table 1. Based on the availability of the databases, the period of 
study is from 2008-2012, with the data obtained for every two years. The study takes its 
data from the 32 states in the Republic of Mexico, including the Distrito Federal (the 
metropolitan area of Mexico City). 
Table 1 
Taking into account the fact that it is not easy to measure the variable of interest in this 
study, the informality of firms, and given that there is not a single definition for it, several 
approaches have been used here. Based on the literature review and data availability, three 
ways to identify and measure informality are proposed: whether the economic unit is 
constituted as a legal entity; whether the economic unit has formal accountancy processes; 
and the sum of the previous two criteria. The three dimensions are considered for owners, 
the self-employed, and a combination of both8. 
The first criterion for indicating informality, referring to the question as to whether the firm 
is constituted as a legal entity, is taken from the a question on ENAMIN survey, “Is your 
business or activity registered before a notary public?”, to which only “Yes” and “No” 
answers are possible. The second criterion of informality is taken from the question, 
referring to the formal accountancy processes used, “In your activity or business…”. When 
                                                            
7 The survey is representative at a national level from 2008 to 2012. The sample for each year is about 30,000 
microfirms owners, but does not include agriculture workers 
8 The numbers of each state were subjected to a weighting factor given by ENAMIN-INEGI 
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the respondent answers that only a “notebook or a notepad is used for accountancy”, or “no 
accountancy is carried out”, the firm is considered as informal. The third criterion takes the 
previous two criteria to form a general indicator. 
Taking into account that indicated in the literature review on the determinants of the 
informality of economic units, specifically for micro firms, the following variables are used 
to describe macroeconomic environment: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a measure of 
the size of each estate; GDP per capita (GDPpc) as measure of the wealth of the population; 
the unemployment rate as a cause of informality; inflation; and, Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). As another factor that is mentioned in the literature is the access or channel to 
financial sources (Gatti and Honorati 2008; Ayana and Reilly 2011), the bank credit (BC) 
was calculated as the commercial credit as a percentage of the GDP of each state. 
In order to take into account the extent of heterogeneity by sector and state, the index of 
specialization in the economy was computed, following the same method used by Dussel9 
(2009). It is also known that the education level in the population is considered to be a 
crucial factor in informality (La Porta and Shleifer 2014), inasmuch as most small informal 
firms are run by people with a lower educational level. 
As explained above, laws and regulations are a very important factor in determining the 
degree of informality. The cost of starting a business is considered an important factor 
inasmuch as it can reflect the level of bureaucracy and cost faced by micro firms, and thus 
the burden in terms of regulation and barriers (Dougherty and Escobar 2013). As taxes are 
considered a very important variable, the taxes collected by each state10 are also measured 
in this study.  
 
                                                            
9 The index of specialization (EI) is computed in the following way: ܧܫ௜௧ ൌ ሺܩܦ ௜ܲ௝ /ܩ ௜ܲሻ / ሺܩܦ ேܲ௝ / ܩܦ ேܲሻ 
where the sector is represented by “i”, the state by “j” and the country N. 
10 It is important to mention that as most taxes in Mexico are collected at a federal level, with some taxes 
collected at a state level, only the following were considered: taxes (sale of used cars, etc.), rights (civil 
registry, etc.), products (sale of properties, etc.) and uses (fines or surtaxes) that are collected by states. 
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Another factor to be considered is the corruption of states, in that this can represent the 
biggest cost faced by firms (Oviedo 2009). This can also be a proxy of the quality of the 
institutions in each state and used as a variable of social stability. In addition to indicators 
of social stability, the global peace index produced by the Vision of Humanity organization 
is also included here. 
4. Methodology 
Taking into account the fact that the information has been obtained every two years for the 
period of study, 2008-2012, this was organized into panel data. Thus, the econometric 
analysis has been conducted in order to ascertain what the determinants of informality are 
for micro-firm for each state in Mexico. The dependent variable is the informality of micro 
firms in each of the 32 states in Mexico. Therefore, the basic model is:  
Inf୧୲ ൌ β଴ ൅ βଵEE୧୲ ൅ βଶSpe୧୲ ൅ βଷReg୧୲ ൅ βସInst୧୲ ൅ U୧୲        (1) 
Where the variable Inf୧୲ is the share of informal micro firms in the state “i” in the year “t”. 
The vector EE୧୲ represents all independent variables for the economic environment 
described in the previous section, such as GDP, GDPpc, unemployment rate, inflation, FDI, 
bank credit. The vector Spe୧୲ includes the sector of specialization as the main activity for 
each state, and the level of education is indicated by the average number school years 
completed by the Economically Active Population11 (EAP). The variable “cost to start a 
business” is considered as a significant and reliable proxy of the regulatory environment for 
business. The variable for corruption is added to the study as a way of representing the 
level of trust in quality of the institutions, while the global peace index is considered in 
order to indicate the level of social stability. 
The database is considered balanced inasmuch as it has the complete observations for 
whole units in the period of time mentioned, and, as the data is available in biannual form, 
the panel data is considered short, in that there are data for many individuals and few 
                                                            
11 They are the people aged 12 years above that  in the week of reference were carrying out some kind of 
economic activity, or they are part of the openly unemployed population. 
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periods of time. 
The model was subjected to the Hausman Test (Wooldridge 2003) in order to decide on the 
best method with which to estimate the model, between the fixed or random effect methods. 
This test takes as null hypothesis the question as to whether the individual effects are 
random, as the estimators should be similar because they are consistent. However, when the 
estimators are different, the other method is deemed better. After doing the test, the result 
was that the best method is the random effect, in that this model assumes that the 
unobservable individual effects are not correlated with the independent variables, or that 
individual effects are randomly distributed across the states. In contrast, the fixed effect 
assumes that the heterogeneity among states can influence the independent variables, but 
the characteristics are assumed as invariant in time. 
As the econometric literature explains, working with panel data, in fact, measures two 
effects: a cross section effect and a time series effect. While these effects are not 
necessarily moving in the same direction because one effect can be positive and the other 
negative, random effect estimations compute an average of both effects, i.e., the average of 
the long and short run specifications (Baltagi and Griffin 1984). In order to take this into 
account in the analysis, these effects are computed between the estimator and fixed effect 
model. 
5. Results 
In order to show an overview of the results, some descriptive statistics are presented below. 
In particular, Figure 3 shows the heterogeneity across the Mexican states, where, there are 
states with bigger economies as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), such as 
Distrito Federal (the metropolitan area of Mexico City), Estado de Mexico (the state 
adjacent to Mexico city), Nuevo León, Jalisco, Veracruz and others where the size of 
economy is much smaller, such as Tlaxcala, Colima, Nayarit, Baja California Sur, and 
Zacatecas. Furthermore, this heterogeneity is found in terms not only of size but also 
wealth, as measured by GDP per capita (GDPpc). In this aspect, there are states that stand 
out, such as Campeche, Distrito Federal, Nuevo Leon, Tabasco, while states with a 
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remarkably high level of poverty, such as Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Tlaxcala, can also be 
found. 
Figure 3 
As can be seen from Figure 4, where informality is measured using the three methods 
proposed above, this research shows an increase in informality from 2008 to 2012. Figure 
5, the 2012 data shows the heterogeneity of economic units among Mexican states and the 
different degrees of informality. For instance, states such as Baja California Sur, Colima, 
and Queretaro have a lower level of informality, while states such as Campeche, Guerrero, 
Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla, are notorious for their high informality levels. 
Figures 4 and 5 
Table 2 shows the results obtained from the econometric analysis of firm informality using 
the three measures proposed. In the first indicator, the criterion is whether or not the micro 
firm is registered with the government through a notary; while the second measure is 
whether or not the firm has formal accountancy processes, and the third is a combination of 
the last two measures, i.e., when a firm is not registered and is does not apply formal 
accountancy. It is worth mentioning that an additional advantage of using the ENAMIN 
survey is that it allows for the differentiation between owners (A) and the self-employed12 
(B), and also the sum of both (A+B), referred to as general, as seen in Table 2. 
Tables 2 and 3 
It is interesting to note for the results for Measure I that, among the variables related to 
economic factors or the macroeconomic environment, the GDP levels are notable due to the 
negative and statistically significant effect on informality in general, and owners and the 
self-employed as well. This variable is statistically significant at one per cent for the owner 
while it is significant at five per cent for general informality, and it is significant at ten per 
cent for the self-employed. 
                                                            
12 Owners have at least one worker and the self-employed is alone although can be helped by relatives. 
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It is worth stressing that as this variable is representative of the market size of each state, it 
is not unusual that it affects both kinds of micro firms, although it does impact much more 
on owners. Furthermore, its negative effect is expected, inasmuch as the informality of 
economic units tends to decrease in a larger or growing state economy.  
The variable corresponding to the second Measure is statistically significant at ten per cent 
and has a positive effect, although this is the result for general informality only, while it is 
not significant for the third Measure III. Table 3 shows that the significance and negative 
relationship are kept even when the temporal effect is included for the first Measure. 
For all measures applied in this study, the variable wealth of population, as measured by 
GDPpc, is statistically significant for general informality, at five per cent, and for the self-
employed, at ten per cent, with its impact in line with theory, with informality reducing 
along with increased among the population and the growth of micro firms. The second 
Measure is statistically significant for the owner and the self-employed, at ten per cent, as it 
is also for the general measure which, at five per cent, has the same negative relationship 
with informality. Statistical significance is stronger for general informality under the third 
Measure, at one per cent, and the self-employed, at five per cent, with owner informality 
maintaining in terms of significance at ten per cent. 
Another variable for considering macroeconomic environment is inflation. Although this 
variable is statistically significant and has a negative effect on informality in almost all the 
measures, at ten percent, when the effect of time is considered, the variable becomes 
positive and significant at five percent for general informality. A proxy of economic 
instability, informality grows with this variable. This result is consistent with theory, which 
says that micro firms are more sensitive to changes in this kind of variable. 
The specialization sector in each economy plays an important role, and, as shown in Table 
2, for the first second and third Measures, all the cases are statistically significant and have 
a negative effect on the informality of economic units. General informality and self-
employed work are statistically significant, at one per cent, while owner informality is 
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statistically significant at five per cent. These results have the same significance and effect 
when the effect of time is applied for the second and third Measures. Therefore, informality 
would be reduced when the states or regions specialize in a specific sector, which is line 
with Dougherty and Escobar (2013), who found similar conclusions albeit having only 
measured informal employment.   
Interestingly, economic variables do not only affect the extent of informality, but also link 
to variables related to institutional quality such as corruption, which is statistically 
significant and has a positive effect, in that the more corruption found in the states, the 
higher the level of informality found there. Under the first Measure, this is statistically 
significant, at one per cent, for owners, the self-employed and the general measure. Under 
the second Measure, the only ones affected are the owners. Owners and the self-employed 
are statistically significant under the third Measure, at five per cent, while the level for 
general informality is significant at ten per cent. Table 3 shows that, even when the effect 
of time is applied to the model, the corruption variable is significant and has the same 
positive effect on informality. 
 This variable is very sensitive in a country such as Mexico where, according to 
Transparency International, ranks 106 out of 177 in the Corruption Perception Index 2013, 
with its law enforcement efforts classified as “little” in combating bribery by the OECD in 
201113. 
As mentioned above, while Foreign Direct Investment may have an impact on informality, 
its impact in this analysis is limited. While, it is statistically significant at five per cent with 
a negative impact, this result is only obtained under the first Measure for general 
informality and self-employed workers, with no impact found for owners. When the effect 
of time is applied, its statistical significance is maintained along with the limitations 
mentioned above. 
                                                            
13 http://www.transparency.org/country#MEX 
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The variables which express the regulatory framework, such as the cost of starting a 
business are important but only under certain circumstances. While, in this research, this is 
only statistically significant for the first measure, the expected negative effect is confirmed 
for owners, at five per cent. This result may be explained by the fact that as the costs rise, 
these impose restrictions on the entrance of less productive firms into the market and limit 
entrepreneurship (Dougherty and Escobar 2013). On the other hand, variables such as 
taxes, which are considered important in the literature, have no visible effect on informality 
in the model. 
As mentioned in the methodology section, the random effect is an average of two effects: 
the between and time series effect. In Appendix 1, these are computed in order to ascertain 
whether or not they have the same effect across the Mexican states. Interestingly, in the 
between effect, variables such as GDP, which represent the size of market, remain 
statistically significant, at a minimum of ten per cent, for general informality and the self-
employed under any measure and at five percent for owners. All cases present a negative 
relationship with the informality of economic units. The variable of bank credit is 
statistically significant, for at least the second and third Measures, with the same positive 
effect for owners and the self-employed. These results agree with the findings of other 
studies, in which the economic variables remain among the most important factors in the 
reduction of informality from the perspective of economic units. 
One of the most surprising aspects in the analysis is that the variable of corruption is 
statistically significant for almost all measures, except the first Measure for owners, having 
positive relationship with informality. As mentioned above, this variable is considered of 
crucial importance in countries such as Mexico, where corrupt practice is extensive and the 
progress made in decreasing it are not encouraging. 
 On other hand, the variable education is statistically significant, with a negative effect on 
micro firm informality. This finding further supports the idea that, at least to some extent, a 
higher education level may be translated in less informality.  
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In the final analysis of the time series approach, the variable unemployment is statistically 
significant, and has a positive effect. It is the self-employed who receive a greater impact 
under the first and second Measures, with a statistically significant level of five per cent. 
While the owners are only statistically significant at ten per cent under the first Measure, 
these observations may support the hypothesis that informality is an alternative to 
unfavorable labor market conditions.  
6. Conclusions 
Informality has been object of several studies not only because it is a growing phenomenon 
in most developing countries, but also due to its consequences in the short and long term. 
However, the difficulties in studying this subject begin with the attempt to define and 
compute it, as there is no single method with which to identify and measure it. Most studies 
have concentrated on the size of labor market informality and, to a lesser extent, on the 
informality of economic units. 
The purpose of the current study was to shed light on the main determinants of economic 
unit informality by state in Mexico. The key strengths of this study were that it took micro 
firms as the object for the study of informality, differentiating the different economic units, 
and thus proposing different ways to measure micro firm informality. The research was 
conducted for each state in a developing country for the period of 2008-2012. The main 
contributions of this study to this area of research are summarized below. 
The investigation of micro firm informality has shown that the economic variables such as 
market size and wealth are the main causes for informality in each state, where, in other 
words, economic stability reduces informality levels. An interesting aspect is that these 
variables are significant under any of the measures proposed in the research. In contrast, the 
variable FDI has a limited effect on micro firm informality, inasmuch as it is only 
statistically significant under a specific kind of measure. 
This study provides additional evidence with respect to the importance of the corruption 
variable inasmuch as it has a statically significant effect as a cause of informality in 
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Mexican states. The variable shows a positive influence under almost every measure 
considered in the study. A key policy priority should, therefore, be to plan better ways to 
reduce corruption, from which governments would be benefit from the increased tax 
revenue. 
Another important finding is that the variable of education has a positive effect on the 
reduction of informality. It has always been considered as a key variable in the 
development of any country, with governments, therefore, able to look to this as a tool in 
the efforts to reduce informality.  
These findings suggest several courses of action for governments, where, specifically, they 
can fight against corruption and strive to improve and extend education. These are tools 
that should be considered of even greater importance for countries such as Mexico. 
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8. Tables  
Table 1. Variables used in the study 
Abbreviation Variable Source 
Inf Informality Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (Size) Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía 
GDPpc Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(wealth) 
-Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
y Geografía 
-Consejo Nacional de Población 
Unemployment Unemployment Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía 
Inflation Inflation Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment Secretaría de Economía 
BC Bank Credit Own elaboration with data of 
Secretaría de Finanzas 
SE Sector Specialization  Own elaboration with data of 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía 
Education Education (Average scholar years of 
Economically Active Population) 
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación 
y Empleo 
Taxes Taxes Own elaboration with data of 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía 
SB Cost to start a business World Bank 
Corruption Corruption Transparency International 
Peace Social stability  
Vision of Humanity 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Table 2. Determinants of micro firms informality  
 Measure I Measure II Measure III 
VARIABLES General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employment  
 (B) 
General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employment  
 (B) 
General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employment  
 (B) 
          
GDP -0.00880** -0.0274*** -0.00741* 0.0285* 0.00435 0.0157 0.0206 -0.00629 0.00828 
 (0.00417) (0.00798) (0.00414) (0.0170) (0.0430) (0.0136) (0.0169) (0.0438) (0.0135) 
GDPpc -0.0240** -0.0138 -0.0219* -0.114** -0.229* -0.0717* -0.125*** -0.229* -0.0846** 
 (0.0113) (0.0216) (0.0112) (0.0471) (0.119) (0.0379) (0.0471) (0.121) (0.0378) 
Unemployment -0.00506 0.0302 -0.00678 -0.0125 -0.0698 0.00203 -0.0278 -0.0710 -0.0139 
 (0.0102) (0.0196) (0.0101) (0.0339) (0.101) (0.0286) (0.0361) (0.104) (0.0300) 
Inflation -0.0134 -0.0433*** -0.0142* -0.0416* -0.148* -0.0480** -0.0556** -0.117 -0.0668*** 
 (0.00868) (0.0166) (0.00862) (0.0249) (0.0807) (0.0213) (0.0270) (0.0831) (0.0228) 
FDI -0.00392** -0.00415 -0.00405** -0.00516 -0.00678 -0.00729 -0.00601 -0.0147 -0.00755 
 (0.00179) (0.00342) (0.00177) (0.00545) (0.0174) (0.00467) (0.00594) (0.0178) (0.00500) 
BC 0.0109* 0.0232* 0.0102 0.0164 0.0456 0.0186 0.0251 0.0697 0.0268 
 (0.00637) (0.0122) (0.00632) (0.0214) (0.0643) (0.0181) (0.0229) (0.0657) (0.0191) 
SE -0.0465*** -0.0589* -0.0444*** -0.203*** -0.324** -0.152*** -0.217*** -0.336** -0.171*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0303) (0.0157) (0.0607) (0.161) (0.0492) (0.0615) (0.165) (0.0498) 
Education 0.0286 -0.269** 0.0547 0.0290 -0.0278 0.00788 0.0905 0.0409 0.0701 
 (0.0605) (0.116) (0.0600) (0.225) (0.622) (0.186) (0.233) (0.634) (0.191) 
Taxes 0.00556 0.00755 0.00605 0.0336 0.0161 0.0248 0.0301 0.00369 0.0224 
 (0.00699) (0.0134) (0.00694) (0.0226) (0.0690) (0.0191) (0.0242) (0.0707) (0.0202) 
SB -0.00705 -0.0250** -0.000675 0.00174 -0.0835 0.00634 -0.00165 -0.0964 0.00659 
 (0.00653) (0.0125) (0.00648) (0.0256) (0.0682) (0.0209) (0.0262) (0.0694) (0.0212) 
Corruption 0.0220*** 0.0331*** 0.0196*** 0.0138 0.135** 0.0119 0.0360* 0.152** 0.0330** 
 (0.00647) (0.0124) (0.00642) (0.0171) (0.0594) (0.0149) (0.0191) (0.0613) (0.0164) 
Peace -0.000410 -0.000385 -0.000270 0.000383 0.000617 0.000407 -0.000152 -0.000610 -6.78e-05 
 (0.000292) (0.000560) (0.000290) (0.00109) (0.00304) (0.000907) (0.00114) (0.00310) (0.000934) 
Constant 4.859*** 5.551*** 4.762*** 5.235*** 6.625*** 5.003*** 5.300*** 6.487*** 5.083*** 
 (0.0922) (0.177) (0.0915) (0.392) (0.980) (0.314) (0.390) (0.994) (0.312) 
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Number of states 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
r2_w 0.220 0.342 0.213 0.353 0.136 0.453 0.365 0.0991 0.483 
r2_b 0.732 0.708 0.618 0.364 0.452 0.284 0.439 0.485 0.379 
r2_o 0.452 0.517 0.376 0.359 0.367 0.328 0.419 0.373 0.410 
Standard Errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * 1p<0.1
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Table 3. Regressions with trend effect 
 Measure I Measure II Measure III 
VARIABLES General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employed  
 (B) 
General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employed 
 (B) 
General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employment  
 (B) 
GDP -0.00633* -0.0245*** -0.00534 0.0320** 0.0133 0.0191 0.0257 0.00444 0.0129 
 (0.00368) (0.00772) (0.00382) (0.0161) (0.0426) (0.0128) (0.0157) (0.0429) (0.0125) 
GDPpc -0.00989 0.00306 -0.0100 -0.0613 -0.159 -0.0306 -0.0693 -0.147 -0.0392 
 (0.0103) (0.0216) (0.0107) (0.0470) (0.123) (0.0377) (0.0463) (0.124) (0.0367) 
Unemployment 0.00234 0.0389** -0.000592 0.000170 -0.0386 0.0142 -0.0106 -0.0334 0.00228 
 (0.00905) (0.0190) (0.00940) (0.0319) (0.101) (0.0270) (0.0336) (0.102) (0.0278) 
Inflation 0.0275** 0.00574 0.0201* 0.0281 0.00987 0.0146 0.0328 0.0742 0.0140 
 (0.0113) (0.0237) (0.0117) (0.0310) (0.116) (0.0272) (0.0343) (0.119) (0.0294) 
FDI -0.00319** -0.00324 -0.00343** -0.00288 -0.00306 -0.00537 -0.00330 -0.0103 -0.00525 
 (0.00157) (0.00329) (0.00163) (0.00513) (0.0172) (0.00441) (0.00552) (0.0175) (0.00462) 
BC 0.00352 0.0144 0.00398 -0.00400 0.0131 0.00180 0.00188 0.0313 0.00716 
 (0.00576) (0.0121) (0.00599) (0.0208) (0.0656) (0.0177) (0.0220) (0.0664) (0.0182) 
SE -0.0165 -0.0232 -0.0194 -0.107* -0.184 -0.0752 -0.112* -0.171 -0.0834 
 (0.0151) (0.0318) (0.0157) (0.0639) (0.176) (0.0517) (0.0636) (0.177) (0.0510) 
Education -0.0250 -0.333*** 0.00984 -0.196 -0.312 -0.167 -0.144 -0.292 -0.120 
 (0.0540) (0.113) (0.0561) (0.221) (0.631) (0.182) (0.225) (0.636) (0.182) 
Taxes -0.00598 -0.00628 -0.00362 0.00315 -0.0365 -0.000887 -0.00557 -0.0590 -0.00840 
 (0.00655) (0.0138) (0.00680) (0.0230) (0.0735) (0.0195) (0.0243) (0.0745) (0.0202) 
SB 0.00195 -0.0142 0.00686 0.0325 -0.0398 0.0309 0.0320 -0.0449 0.0344* 
 (0.00599) (0.0126) (0.00622) (0.0257) (0.0711) (0.0210) (0.0259) (0.0715) (0.0208) 
Corruption 0.0192*** 0.0298** 0.0173*** 0.0127 0.129** 0.0107 0.0335* 0.144** 0.0306** 
 (0.00568) (0.0119) (0.00590) (0.0159) (0.0585) (0.0139) (0.0175) (0.0599) (0.0150) 
Peace -0.000309 -0.000267 -0.000186 0.000402 0.000867 0.000445 -9.45e-05 -0.000292 8.13e-06 
 (0.000256) (0.000539) (0.000266) (0.00102) (0.00299) (0.000851) (0.00105) (0.00302) (0.000857) 
Trend effect 0.0233*** 0.0278*** 0.0195*** 0.0471*** 0.0924* 0.0404*** 0.0565*** 0.111** 0.0500*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00997) (0.00494) (0.0139) (0.0496) (0.0121) (0.0152) (0.0507) (0.0129) 
Constant 4.668*** 5.324*** 4.603*** 4.857*** 5.866*** 4.674*** 4.838*** 5.574*** 4.672*** 
 (0.0895) (0.188) (0.0929) (0.385) (1.046) (0.311) (0.383) (1.054) (0.306) 
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Number of states 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
r2_w 0.408 0.410 0.342 0.448 0.161 0.516 0.472 0.140 0.561 
r2_b 0.797 0.732 0.694 0.440 0.501 0.384 0.530 0.542 0.508 
r2_o 0.588 0.563 0.486 0.436 0.401 0.419 0.510 0.417 0.520 
                           Standard Errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * 1p<0.1
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Annex 1. Estimations with between effect 
 Measure I Measure II Measure III 
VARIABLES General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employed 
 (B) 
General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employed 
 (B) 
General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employment  
 (B) 
          
GDP -0.0108* -0.0160 -0.0106* -0.0419 -0.150** -0.0303 -0.0513* -0.152** -0.0403* 
 (0.00548) (0.0124) (0.00596) (0.0287) (0.0687) (0.0222) (0.0268) (0.0681) (0.0209) 
GDPpc -0.00418 -0.00493 -0.00464 -0.00391 -0.0330 0.00380 0.0108 -0.0299 0.0191 
 (0.0122) (0.0276) (0.0133) (0.0637) (0.153) (0.0492) (0.0595) (0.151) (0.0465) 
Unemployment 0.00897 0.0338 0.00572 -0.0172 -0.0429 -0.0185 0.000139 -0.0488 0.000320 
 (0.0119) (0.0269) (0.0129) (0.0622) (0.149) (0.0481) (0.0581) (0.148) (0.0454) 
Inflation 0.0105 0.0109 0.00901 -0.0454 -0.103 -0.0415 -0.0493 -0.0539 -0.0480 
 (0.0231) (0.0523) (0.0251) (0.121) (0.289) (0.0934) (0.113) (0.287) (0.0882) 
FDI -0.00588*** -0.00756 -0.00582** 0.0173 0.0331 0.0129 0.0128 0.0243 0.00873 
 (0.00195) (0.00441) (0.00212) (0.0102) (0.0244) (0.00788) (0.00953) (0.0242) (0.00745) 
BC 0.00843 0.000394 0.0110 0.0745* 0.198* 0.0575* 0.0796* 0.216** 0.0618* 
 (0.00798) (0.0181) (0.00869) (0.0417) (0.100) (0.0323) (0.0390) (0.0992) (0.0305) 
SE -0.0227 -0.0279 -0.0282 -0.133 -0.331 -0.0927 -0.127 -0.311 -0.0883 
 (0.0165) (0.0374) (0.0180) (0.0864) (0.207) (0.0668) (0.0807) (0.205) (0.0631) 
Education -0.0512 -0.194 -0.0216 -0.711* -1.386 -0.506 -0.778** -1.318 -0.583* 
 (0.0745) (0.169) (0.0811) (0.390) (0.934) (0.301) (0.364) (0.927) (0.285) 
Taxes -0.00178 0.00346 0.00122 -0.0502 -0.120 -0.0481 -0.0544 -0.159 -0.0502 
 (0.00775) (0.0176) (0.00844) (0.0405) (0.0972) (0.0313) (0.0379) (0.0963) (0.0296) 
SB 0.000433 -0.0266 0.00594 0.0231 -0.0875 0.0337 0.0322 -0.0894 0.0441 
 (0.00684) (0.0155) (0.00745) (0.0358) (0.0858) (0.0277) (0.0335) (0.0850) (0.0261) 
Corruption 0.0259** 0.00772 0.0244* 0.237*** 0.582*** 0.169*** 0.257*** 0.582*** 0.190*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0266) (0.0128) (0.0615) (0.147) (0.0475) (0.0575) (0.146) (0.0449) 
Peace -0.000492 0.000286 -0.000419 -0.00154 -0.00151 -0.00129 -0.00195 -0.00292 -0.00162 
 (0.000329) (0.000745) (0.000358) (0.00172) (0.00412) (0.00133) (0.00161) (0.00409) (0.00126) 
Constant 4.758*** 5.167*** 4.693*** 5.851*** 7.867*** 5.388*** 5.841*** 7.582*** 5.399*** 
 (0.128) (0.290) (0.139) (0.670) (1.606) (0.518) (0.627) (1.593) (0.490) 
          
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
R-squared 0.803 0.745 0.698 0.742 0.727 0.707 0.784 0.743 0.757 
Number of states 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
p 0.000182 0.00154 0.00587 0.00168 0.00266 0.00457 0.000398 0.00162 0.00106 
r2_w 2.85e-05 0.00670 0.00253 0.0153 0.000627 0.0229 0.00172 0.000512 0.00145 
r2_b 0.803 0.745 0.698 0.742 0.727 0.707 0.784 0.743 0.757 
r2_o 0.295 0.356 0.232 0.264 0.243 0.187 0.292 0.245 0.227 
                Standard Errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * 1p<0.1   
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Annex 2.  Estimations with time series effect 
 Measure I Measure II Measure III 
VARIABLES General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-Employed  
 (B) 
General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-
Employed  
 (B) 
General  
(A+B) 
Owner  
(A) 
Self-
Employment  
 (B) 
          
GDP 0.0408 -0.131 0.0192 0.375 1.040 0.247 0.275 1.327 0.135 
 (0.179) (0.333) (0.183) (0.330) (1.389) (0.294) (0.374) (1.419) (0.328) 
GDPpc 0.273 0.802* 0.161 0.0783 -1.022 0.201 0.240 -0.648 0.329 
 (0.240) (0.446) (0.245) (0.442) (1.860) (0.393) (0.500) (1.901) (0.440) 
Unemployment 0.0346 0.109* 0.0152 0.0958* 0.0341 0.121** 0.101 0.151 0.115** 
 (0.0298) (0.0554) (0.0305) (0.0549) (0.231) (0.0489) (0.0622) (0.236) (0.0546) 
Inflation 0.00252 -0.0298 -0.00884 0.000495 -0.169 -0.00516 -0.00527 -0.0993 -0.0173 
 (0.0169) (0.0315) (0.0173) (0.0312) (0.131) (0.0278) (0.0354) (0.134) (0.0311) 
FDI 0.000818 0.00569 -0.000384 -0.00249 0.00491 -0.00581 -0.00133 -0.000498 -0.00435 
 (0.00328) (0.00610) (0.00335) (0.00604) (0.0254) (0.00538) (0.00684) (0.0260) (0.00601) 
BC 0.00864 0.0403 0.00453 -0.00329 -0.0438 -0.00458 0.00440 -0.0611 0.00487 
 (0.0131) (0.0244) (0.0134) (0.0242) (0.102) (0.0215) (0.0274) (0.104) (0.0241) 
SE 0.286 0.501 0.135 0.276 -0.455 0.248 0.302 0.101 0.228 
 (0.214) (0.398) (0.219) (0.395) (1.662) (0.351) (0.447) (1.698) (0.393) 
Education 0.161 -0.352 0.163 -0.0253 -0.683 -0.139 0.125 -0.816 0.0353 
 (0.212) (0.395) (0.217) (0.391) (1.648) (0.348) (0.443) (1.684) (0.390) 
Taxes -0.00983 -0.0194 -0.00552 0.0339 0.131 0.0304 0.0270 0.144 0.0226 
 (0.0148) (0.0275) (0.0151) (0.0273) (0.115) (0.0243) (0.0309) (0.117) (0.0271) 
SB 0.00392 0.000395 0.00723 0.0433 0.125 0.0199 0.0302 0.143 0.00479 
 (0.0222) (0.0412) (0.0227) (0.0408) (0.172) (0.0363) (0.0462) (0.176) (0.0406) 
Corruption 0.00637 0.0170 0.00647 -0.0218 -0.00809 -0.0231 -0.0133 -0.00692 -0.0132 
 (0.00955) (0.0178) (0.00977) (0.0176) (0.0741) (0.0157) (0.0199) (0.0757) (0.0175) 
Peace -0.000202 -0.00181 0.000223 0.00128 0.00300 0.00124 0.000534 0.00201 0.000550 
 (0.000773) (0.00144) (0.000791) (0.00142) (0.00600) (0.00127) (0.00161) (0.00613) (0.00142) 
Constant 0.468 -2.528 2.060 -1.384 4.147 -0.834 -2.335 -3.727 -1.284 
 (1.828) (3.399) (1.868) (3.367) (14.17) (2.997) (3.814) (14.49) (3.352) 
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
R-squared 0.379 0.475 0.308 0.487 0.265 0.572 0.510 0.260 0.605 
Number of states 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
p 0.0301 0.00224 0.129 0.00150 0.259 6.29e-05 0.000697 0.278 1.47e-05 
r2_w 0.379 0.475 0.308 0.487 0.265 0.572 0.510 0.260 0.605 
r2_b 0.431 0.324 0.250 0.000851 0.0419 6.99e-05 0.0116 0.00606 0.0213 
r2_o 0.165 0.142 0.0706 0.00264 0.0461 0.000393 0.00546 0.00771 0.00883 
                   Standard Errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 , ** p<0.05 , * 1p<0.1 
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9. Figures 
Figure 1.  Informal Economy 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Figure 2.  Measuring informality of Establishments 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Informal Economy
Informal Sector
(productions units)
Informal Employment
(Number of employees)
Measuring informality of 
establishments
Companies informal 
employers
* Small size company in terms of
employment
* Lack of company registration
* Non‐registration of employees
*Size: small by definition.
*They are not registered in the
national legislation.
(Proxy: Absence of legal
identity + lack of accounting)
Self employees
2 Basic definitions:
i) informality‐Register Relationship
ii) A particular form of production:
organization and activities
iii) Both
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Figure 3.  GDP and GDP per capita by state 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Three different ways to measure Micro Firm informality 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Figure 5.  Heterogeneity of micro firms informality by state 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
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